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time, as in the principal case, should a
person be allowed two suits ? Is there
more than one cause of action in such
case any more than in the others, where
two actions are not allowed ? It certainly seems that the reasoning of CorBRIDGE, C. J., in the principal case, is
more in harmony with the established
rules of law. And it should be noted
that the opinion of POLLOCK, B., and

Lo Es, J., in the court below, 11 Q. B.
712, were on the same side, so that really
the majority of those judges who have
expressed opinions on the subject are
against successive actions in such cases.
EDMUND H. BEiNETT.
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SWANN v. SWANN.
Contracts made on the Lord's day are not void on religious or moral grounds,
but upon the familiar and established doctrine that when a statute inflicts a penalty
for doing an act-no matter what that act may be-a court of justice will not
enforce a contract made in violation of such statute, and in the making of which
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the parties to it incurr-o

the prescribed penalty.

A penalty implies a prohibition

of the thing itself, on tile doing of which the penalty is to accrue.
When, by the laws of a state, a large class of its citizens may lawfully labor
and make contracts on the Lord's day, it is not, in a legal sense, against the pub-

lie policy of such state, nor shocking to the moral sense of its .people, for its
courts to enforce a contract made on that day in another state, and valid by the law
of that state.
A contract made on the Lord's day, and valid by the law of the state where made,

will be enforced by the courts of another state, by the laws of which such contract
would be void.
The only authentic and admissible evidence of the public policy of a state, on any

given subject, are its constitution, laws and judicial decisions.

AT law.
Ratcliff & Fletch~er, for plaintiff.
Clark & Williams, for defendant.
CALDWELL, J.-This suit is founded on a promissory note of
which the defendant is the maker and the plaintiff the payee. The
defence is that the note was executed on the Lord's day. The proof
shows the note was executed on that day in the state of Tennessee,
where the parties to it then resided, for the consideration of a valid
pre-existing debt due from the defendant to the plaifltiff. There is
no place of payment fixed in the note.
In Tucker v. West, 29 Ark. 386, a note executed in this state
on the Lord's day was held to be void under the statute. This
court takes judicial notice of the laws of the several states: Owings
v. Hfull, 9 Pet. 607 ; Railroad Co. v. Bank of Ashland, 12 Wall.
226.
By the law of Tennessee, where the note was executed, it is a
valid obligation. In Arnis v. Kfle, 2 Yerg. 31, the Supreme Court
held that the statute of that state only prohibited labor and business
in the "ordinary calling" of the parties; and that isolated private
contracts, made by parties outside of their ordinary calling, are not
invalidated. This rule was carried to a great length in the case
cited. An obligation, to be discharged in horses, was made payable
on the Lord's day, and the court held the contract valid, and that
a tender of the horses, to have the effect of discharging the obligation, must be made on that day. This was held upon the ground
that the sale and delivery of horses was not the ordinary calling of
either of the parties. The attention of the court has not been
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called to any later exposition of the law of that state than is contained in this decision, and it will be assumed that there is none.
Under the rule established in Amis v. Kyle, it is obvious the
note, which is the foundation of this suit, was valid in Tennessee.
The execution of a note for a pre-existing debt was probably not
the ordinary calling of either of the parties. If it was, the burden
of proof was on the defendant to show it: Boys v. Johnson, 7 Gray
162; Bloxsome v. Williams, 3 B. & 0. 232. The doctrine of the
Supreme Court of Tennessee is the doctrine of the early English
cases under the statute of 29 Chas. II.c. 7, which prohibited labor
only in the "ordinary calling of the parties: -Druryv. -Defontaine,
1 Taunt. 131; Bloxsome v. Williams, supra; .Rex v. Whitnash,
7 B. & C. 596; Pennell v. Bidler, 5 Id. 406; Rex v. Brotherton,
2 Strange 702. It is also the doctrine of some of the American
cases: Hlellams v. Abercromblie, 15 S.C. 110; Bloom v. Richards,
2 Ohio St. 387 ; George v. George, 47 N. H. 27; Hazard v. -Day,
14 Allen 487. Of course, the law of this state has nor extra-territorial operation, and cannot affect the validity pf contracts executed
elsewhere on the Lord's day. And the general rule is that a contract valid by the law of the place where it is made is valid everywhere, and will be enforced by the courts of every other country.
But there are exceptions to this general rule, and among them
contracts against good morals, and that tend to promote vice and
crirfe, and contracts against -the settled public policy of the state,
will not be enforced, although they may be valid by the law of the
place where they are made: Story on Confl. of Laws, § 244 Westl.
Int. Law, § 196 ;'Whart. Confl. Laws, §.490.
The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant is that
a court of this state ought not to enforce a contract made on the
Lord's day in another state, though valid by the law of that state,
because the contract is the result of an immoral and irreligious act,
and its enforcement here would shock the moral sense of the community and violate the public policy of the state. Assuming, but
not deciding, that the determination of this question must be the
same in this 'court that it would be in a court of the state, we will
proceed to inquire whether there is any principle upon which a court
of the state could refuse to enforce the contract in suit.
The common law made no distinction between the Lord's day and
any other day. Contracts entered into on that day were as valid
as those made on any other day. The contract in suit was volun-
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tarily entered into, between parties capable of contracting, for a
lawful and valuable consideration. It had relation to a subject-matter about which it was lawful to contract, and was a valid contract
when and where it was made. No court ought to refuse its aid to
enforce such a contract on doubtful and uncertain grounds. The
burden is on the defendant to show that its enforcement would be in
violation of the settled public policy of this state, or injurious to
the morals of its people. Vague surmises and flippant assertions
as to what is the public policy of the state, or what would be shocking to the moral sense of its people, are not to be indulged in. The
law points out the sources of information to which courts must appeal to determine the public policy of a state. The term, as it is
often popularly used and defined, makes it an unknown and variable
quantity, much too indefinite and uncertain to be made the foundation of a judgment. The only authentic and admissible evidence
of the public policy of a state on any given subject are its constitution, laws and judicial decisions. The public policy of a-state,
of which courts take notice, and to which they give effect, must be
deduced from these sources.
In Vidal v. Girard's.E'rs,2 How. 127, 198, it was objected by
Mr. Webster that the foundation of the Girard College, upon the
principles prescribed by the testator, was "derogatory and hostile
to the Christian religion, ana so is void as being against the common
law and public policy of 'Pennsylvania." In replying to this argument the court said: "Nor are we at liberty to look at general considerations of the supposed public interests and policy of Pennsylvania upon this subject, beyond what its constitution and laws and
judicial decisions make known to us." * * *
What is there, then, in the constitution, laws and decisions of
this state evincing a public policy hostile to the enforcement of contracts lawfully made in other states on the Lord's day? The constitution of the state declares: "No human authority can, in any case
or manner whatsoever, control or interfere with the right of conscience; and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishment, denomination or mode of worship above any
other. * * * No religious test shall ever be required of any person
hs a qualification to vote or hold office; nor shall any person be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his religious belief:"
Const. 1874, §§ 24, 26.
So much of the statute of the state as has any bearing on this
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question reads as follows: "Sect. 1614. Every person who shall, on
the Sabbath or Sunday, be found laboring, or shall compel his
apprentice or servant to labor or perform other services than cus.
tomary household duties of daily necessity, comfort or charity, on
conviction thereof shall be fined one dollar for each separate offence."
* * * "Sect. 1617. rersons who are members of any religious
society, who observe as Sabbath any other day of the week than the
Christian Sabbath or Sunday, shall not be subject to the penalties
of this act, so that they observe one day in seven, agreeably to the
faith and practice of their church or society."
It is obvious the statute does not attempt to compel the observance of the first day of the week, as a day of rest, as a yeligious
duty. It would be a nullity if it did so.
"In Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387, the court, THURMAN,
J., delivering the opinion, said: "Thus the statute upon which the
defendant relies, prohibiting common labor on the Sabbath, could
not stand for a moment as a law of this state, if its sole foundation
was the Christian duty of keeping that day holy, and its sole motive
to enforce the observance of that duty."
And see, to the same effect, Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Barr
312; 6ity Council of Clarleston v. Benjamin, 2 Strob. 508.
In this country legislative authority is limited strictly to temporal
affairs by written constitutions. Under these constitutions there
can be no mingling of the affairs of church and state by legislative
authority. All religions are tolerated and none is established.
Each has an equal right to the protection of the law, whether
Christians, *Jews or infidels: Andrew v. Bible Society, 4 Sandf.
(N. Y.) 182; Ayres v. Methodist Church, 3 Id. 377; Cooley
Const. Lim. 472. No citizen can be required by law to do, or refrain from doing, any act upon the sole ground that it is a religious
duty. The old idea that religious faith and practice can be, and
should be, propagated by physical force and penal statutes has no
place in the American doctrine of government. Force can only
effect external observances; whereas, religion consists in a temper
of heart and conscious faith which force can neither implant nor
efface. History records the mischievous consequences of all efforts
to propagate religion, or alter man's relations to his Maker, bypenal
statutes. In religion no man is his neighbor's keeper, and no more
is the state the keeper of the religious conscience of the people.
The state protects all religions, but espouses none. Every man is
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individually answerable to his God for his faith and his works, and
must therefore be left free to imbibe and practice any faith he
chooses, so long as he does not interfere with the rights of his neighbor. The statute, then, is not a religious regulation, but is the
result of a legitimate exercise of the police power, and is itself a
police regulation: Slaughter-house Cases, 16 Wail. 36, 62, and
cases cited; Bloom v. .Richards,supra; Specht v. Commonwealth,
supra ; City of Charleston v. Benjamin, supra.
Experience has shown the wisdom and necessity of having, at
stated intervals, a day of rest from customary toil and labor for
man and beast. It renews flagging energies, prevents premature
decay, promotes the social virtues, tends to repress vice, aids and
encourages religious teachings and practice, and affords an oppor"tunity for innocent and healthful amusement and recreation. Neither man nor beast can stand the strain of constant and unremitting
toil. Such a day, when designated by the state, is a civil and not
a religious institution. No merely religious duty is enjoined. The
statute does not require attendance on church, any more than it
requires attendance to hear a lecture in support of infidelity. In
point of~lawfulness, there is no difference between an orthodox sermon and such a lecture on the Lord's day, in this state. The
legislature might have required all .persons to abstain from labor on
the first or any other day of the week, without reference to their
religious preferences or practices in that regard. But the statute
of this state does not go to that length. While the law does not
enforce religious duties and obligations as such, it has a tender regard for the conscience and convenience of every citizen in all
matters relating to his religious faith and practice. The statute is
catholic in its spirit, and accommodates itself to the varying religious faiths and practices of the people. In legal effect it declares
every person must observe one day out of seven as a day of rest.
But it does not attempt to bind all to the observance of the same
day. Such a requirement would have the effect to compel many to
observe two days of rest in each week, the statutory day and the
day which their religious faith constrained them to observe. The
statute designates the first day of the week as the day of rest for
all who do not by reason of their religious faith and practice observe
some other day. Christians, who regard the first day of the week
as a sacred day; infidels, who regard no day as holy; and Friends,
who hold there is no more holiness in one day than another, but
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that all are to be kept holy, are by the statute constrained to desist
from labor on the first day of the week. On the other hand, Jews
and Seventh-day Baptists may pursue their ordinary callings on
that day, if they observe the seventh day of the week according to
their faith; and Mohammedans may labor on the first, if they observe
the sixth day of the week according to their faith. The statute
grants to all persons, who, in the exercise of their religious faith
and practice, observe one day in the week as a day of rest, the liberty of working on every other day of the week, without qualification
or limitation. In this respect there is a pronounced difference
between the law of this and some of the other states.
In many other states but slight regard is shown to those who observe any other than the first day of the week as a day of rest.
The New York statute provides: "Nor shall there be any servile
working or laboring on that day, excepting works of necessity and
charity, unless done by some person who uniformly keeps the last
day of the week, called Saturday, as holy time, and does not labor
or work on that day, and whose labor shall not disturb other persons
in their observance of the first day of the week as holy time."
The New Jersey statute provides that it shall be a sufficient defence for working on the Sabbath day, that the defendant keeps the
seventh day as the Sabbath: "provided, always, that the work or
labor for which such person is informed against is done and performed in his or her dwelling-house or workshop, or on his or her
premises or plantation, and that such work or labor has not disturbed other persons in the observance of the first day of the week
as the Sabbath." And it has been held that whatever draws the
attention of others from the appropriate duties of the Lord's day
disturbs them. And where one purchased a horse and gave his
note for the same, in his own house, in the presence of his wife, the
seller, and one other person, whose religious feelings were not at all
shocked, and who made no complaint, it was held to be "to the
disturbance of others :" Trarney,v. French, 19 N. H. 233.
But the statute of this state draws no such invidious distinctions
between those Christians who observe the first and those-be they
Christians, Jews or Mohammedans-who observe "any other day
of the week, * * * agreeably to the faith and practice of their
church or society."
It is not true, therefore, that all contracts made in this state on
the Lord's day are void. A large number of the citizens of the
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state may lawfully labor and make contracts on that day. There
can be no doubt of the validity of a note executed in this state
on the Lord's day, when the parties to it refrain from labor on
"any other day of the week, * * * agreeably to the faith and
practice of their church or society." The validity of contracts made
in this state on that day depends, therefore, on whether the parties to them conscientiously observe some other day of the week
as a day of rest. If they do, their contracts made on the Lord's
day are valid. Such contracts the courts of the state would be
bound to enforce. If, then, it would be the duty of. the courts of
the state to enforce contracts made in the state between its own citizens on the Lord's day, having no relation to "household duties
of daily necessity, comfort or charity," how can it be said that the
public policy of the state forbids the enforcement of such contracts
made in another state, and valid by the law of that state ? A court
cannot declare that the public policy of the state evinces such a high
regard for the sacredness of the Lord's day as to forbid it to enforce
a contract lawfully made on that day in another state, when it is
bound by law to enforce contracts made on that day in its own state.
It may be justifiable in private life to "assume a virtue, though
you have it not;" but courts in the impartial administration of
justice, are forbidden to assume a higher regard for the holiness of
the Lord's day than is found in the constitution and laws of the
state. To do so would deprive suitors of their rights without law,
and would, besides, be in the highest degree pharisaical. And if
the courts of the state would enforce contracts made on that day in
the state between certain classes of her own citizens, how can the
moral sense of the people of the state be said to be shocked by enforcing such contracts lawfully entered into elsewhere? No court
is at liberty to impeach the constitution and laws under which it
derives its jurisdiction and authority as a court, by assuming that
what is lawful under them is shocking to the moral sense of the
people who enacted them. But if no contracts made on that day
in the state could be enforaed, there would still be nothing in the
objection that their enforcement would be too shocking to the moral
sense of the community to be tolerated, for reasons forcibly stated
by Judge REDFIELD, in delivering the opinion of the court in
Adams v. Cay, 19 Vt. 358, 367: "And before we could determine
that any given cause shocked the moral feelings of the community,
sve must be able to find but one pervading feeling upon that subject;
VOL.
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so much so, that a contrary feeling, in an individual, would denominate him either insane, or diseased in his moral perceptions. Now,
nothing is more absurd to my mind, than to argue the existence of
any such universal moral sentiment in regard to the observance of
Sunday. It is in no just sense a moral sentiment at all which
impels us to the observance of Sunday, for religious purposes, more
than any other day. Itis but education and habit, in the main certainly. Moral feeling might dictate the devotion of a portion of
our time to religious rites and solemnities, but could never indicate
any particular time above all others."
It is believed the moral sense of the community would esteem it
a morally dishonest act for a debtor to refuse to pay a just debt
because the evidence of it was executed on the Lord's day. Christians vary in their opinions of the manner in which the Lord's day
ought to be kept. In continental Europe, sports, games and practices are freely indulged in on that day, with the approval of the
church, which the larger number of Protestant churches of England
and this country do not approve.
The large emigration from Europe to this country is having a
marked influence on public opinion, particularly in towns and cities,
as to how the Lord's day ought to be kept. The Puritan view of the
question has undergone some modifications through this influence.
As a result of less restricted views on the subject, in this city, in
the shadow of the capitol there are more than half a hundred places
where spirituous liquors are sold on Sunday, the same as any other
day in the week, without molestation from the state or city authorities. It would be downright hypocrisy for a court to affect to believe that the moral sense of the community, which supports this
condition of things, would be shocked by compelling a man to pay
a note given for an honest debt because it was executed on the
Lord's day. There may be a good many individuals who would
feel so, but they do not constitute the community in the legal sense
of that term.
It is an error to suppose that the Supreme Court of the state, in
Tucker v..TWest, supra, held Lord's day contracts void on religious
or moral grounds. That is not the ground upon which they are
held void by any of the courts. The court held that the execution
by the maker and the receipt by the payee of a promissory note was
-"labor," within the meaning of that word, as used in the statute.
It of course follows that the parties to a note executed on the
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Lord's day incur the penalty of the statute against those who labor
on that day, viz., a fine of one dollar. By reference to the statute
it will be observed that it does not in terms prohibit labor, or declare
contracts void. It simply denounces a penalty against those "found
laboring." Here two familiar and established rules of decision
come into play. One of these is, that a penalty implies a prohibition of the thing itself, on the doing of which the penalty is to
accrue, though there are no prohibitory words in the statute; and
the other is, that a court of justice will give no assistance to the
enforcement of contracts which the law of the land has interdicted.
"The ground upon which courts have refused to maintain
actions on contracts made in contravention of statutes for the
observance of the Lord's day, is the elementary principle that one
who has himself participated in a violation of law cannot be permitted to assert in a court of justice any right founded upon or
growing out of the illegal transaction :" Cransonv. Goss, 107 Mass.
439; Holman v. Johnson, Cowp. 341; Gibbs & Sterrett YXanuf'g
Co. v. Brucker, 111 U. S. 597. There have been vigorous protests from time to time against the application of these principles
to Lord's day contracts, upon the ground that they inflicted penalties, by judicial construction, out of all proportion to the offence,
and not contemplated by the act (Bloom v. Richards, supra; and
see remarks of GRIER, J., in Philadelphia,W. & B. Railroad Co.
v. Philadelphia& Havre de Grace S. B. Co., 23 How. 218); but
the great weight of authority is that a contract made in violation
of the Lord's day acts is void, like any other illegal and prohibited
contract, and upon no other or different ground. And the reason
that a contract made in this state on the Lord's day between persons
"who observe as Sabbath any other day of the week" is not void,
is that the statute expressly declares they "shall not be subject to
the penalties of this act," and as there is no prohibition in terms
in the statute, it results that there is neither penalty nor prohibition
against such persons making contracts or performing any other kind
of labor-on the Lord's day. But if by the statute all contracts
made in this state on the Lord's day were void, it is believed that
the result in the case at bar would not be different.
There is often great difficulty in practice in drawing the line between the foreign contracts which may and may not be enforced.
The rules defining the comity of states in this regard are necessarily
general in their terms, and the adjudged cases are not quite uniform.
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No case has been cited, and it is believed none can be found, holding that a contract made on the Lord's day in a state where such
contracts are valid, will not be enforced by the courts of another
state, by the laws of which such contracts are void. But there is
one case at least (there may be others which our limited examination failed to discover) that holds that in such case the contract
will be enforced. The case is entitled to consideration, no less
on account of the uniform high character of the decisions of the
court than the acknowledged learning and ability of the judge who
delivered the opinion. In Adams v. Gay, supra, the precise question arose. A contract which, if it had been made in Vermont,
would have been void under the Lord's day act of that state, was
made in New Hampshire on the Lord's day. In a suit arising
upon that contract in Vermont, the question arose whether the
courts of that state would give it effect. The court refused to take
judicial notice of the law of New Hampshire, and did not indulge
the presumption that it was the same as that of Vermont. The
court, Judge REDFIELD delivering the opinion, said: "The law of
New Hampshire, then, being out of the case on account of its not
having been proved at the trial, the contract between the parties is
valid, unless it is void upon general principles of public policy, as
being of evil example to our own citizens to see such a contract
enforced in a court of justice."
And, after a full discussion of the subject, the court, on the assumption that the contract was valid in New Hampshire, held it
valid in Vermont.
It has been decided that contracts for the purchase of lottery
tickets, if valid where made, will be treated as valid and enforced
in the courts of a state by the laws of which such contracts are
illegal: McIntyre v. Parks, 3 Mete. 207 ; (in Webster v. Munger,
8 Gray 587, THOMAS, J., expresses the opinion that MeIntyre v.
Parks, was not rightly decided); Kentucky v. Bassford, 6 Hill
526. And the same doctrine has been maintained with reference
to gambling contracts: Whart. Confl. Laws, §§ 487, 492.
This court is not to be understood as expressing any opinion as
to the soundness of the doctrine of the cases last cited. They carry
the doctrine of comity further than it is necessary to go to uphold
the action in the case at bar. Lottery and gambling contracts are
very generally regarded as inherently vicious and immoral, and
wanting in a meritorious consideration, whenever and wherever
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made. Whereas, the contract in suit was not only obligatory where
made, but was made for a valuable and meritorious consideration;
and the only objection to its validity is that it was executed on an
inappropriate day of the week-a circumstance in which it would
seem a state, other than that in which the contract was made, could
have very little concern.
It has been held that when the law of the state where the contract was made, and the law of the state where the suit is brought,
are the same, and a contract made on the Lord's day is void by the
laws of both states, it will not be enforced; and that,.in the absence
of proof to the contrary, the law will be presumed to be the same
in both states: Bill v. Wilker, 41 Ga. 449;' Sayre v. Wheeler, 32
Iowa 559.
Commx-LAw RuLE.-As to the mak-

ing of contracts, and all other acts not
of a judicial nature, the common law
made no distinction between Sunday and
any other day: Drury v. Defontaine, I
Taunt. 135 ; Kepner v. Keefer, 6 Watts
231; Rex v. Brotherton, Stra. 702;
Story v. Elliot, 8 Cow. 27 ; Fox v.
Mensch, 3 W. & S. 444 ; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 387 ; Horace v. Keebler,
5 Neb. 355; Adamsv. Gay, 19 Vt. 365.
But in England and pretty generally
in the United States, more or less stringent laws have been enacted, by which
all ordinary labor and business are forbidden.
The principal English statute is that
of 29 Car. II.,
c. 7, 1. The language
is : "that no tradesman, artificer, workman, laborer or other person whatsoever,
shall do or exercise any worldly labor,
business or work of their ordinary callings upon the Lord's Day, or any part
thereof, (works of "necessity"
and
"charity" only excepted) ; and "that
no person shall publicly cry, show forth,
or expose to sale, any wares, merchandises, fruit, herbs, goods or chattels upon
the Lord's Day or any part thereof."
Very similar statutes have been enacted
in this country.
WORKS

OF NECESSITY AND CHARITY.

-Works of "necessity"

and "charity"

are excepted from the operation of Sunday statutes. And by a work of "necessity," is not meant a physical and
absolute necessity, but any labor, business or work, which is morally fit and
proper to be done on that day, under the
circumstances of the particular case is a
case of "necessity"
within the statute.
Ragg v. Inhabitants of Millbury, 4 Cush.
243.
In McGatrick v. Wason, 4 Ohio St.
567, the court held that works of "necessity" are not limited to labor for the
preservation of life, health or property
from impending danger. The "necessity" may grow out of, or indeed be incident to the general course of business,
or even be an exigiency of a particular
trade or business, and yet be within the
exception of the act. Thus the danger
of navigation being closed, may make it
lawful to load a vessel on Sunday, if
there is no other time to do so.
The harvestingof "dead-ripe"
wheat
which could not be cut sooner, and
which might be spoiled by rain if left
until a later day, is a work of "1necessity:" Turner v. State, 67 Ind. 595.
A journey on Sunday to visit one's
children who are properly away from
home is not against the statute prohibiting travelling on that day: McCeary v.
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Lowell, 44 Vt. 116; and a journey to
procure medicine for a sick child is
within the exception: Gorman v. City of
Lowell, 117 Mass. 65.
Where a defect in a highway, for an
injury occasioned by which to person or
property the town would be liable, is
found to exist on Sunday, it is the duty
of such town to repair the defect immediately or to adopt measures to guard
against the danger until such repairs can
be made; and work, labor, or business
for this work is "necessity"
within the
*meaning of the statute: Flayg v. Inhabitants of Millbury, supra; see Johnson v.
Irasburg, 47 Vt. 28. Raising subscriptions from a congregation on Sunday to
pay off a church debt, or purchase a
house of worship, is a work of "charity"
within the statute, and subscriptions may
be sustained: Allen v. Duffle, 43 Mich.
1 ; Dale v. Knapp, 98 Penn. St. 389.
A necessity may exist to work on Sunday to prevent a great waste of sap in
making maple sugar: Whitcomb v. Gilman, 35 Vt. 297. The feeding of hogs
on Sunday is a lawful work ; and if,
according to the circumstances of the
particular case, the usual and proper
means to feed, according to the practice
of good husbandry, is to gather the
necessary feed daily in the field, haul it
to the feeding place and there feed it to
them, such work is not unlawful: Edgerton v. State, 67 Ind. 588.
The running of passenger trains has
been held a work of" necessity": Commonwealth v. L. 4- AT., 4-c., Ry. Co., 80
Ky. 291. And the forwarding of cattle
by a railway company : Phila., 6-c., By.
Co. v. Lehman, 56 Md. 209. See also
Commonwealth v. Sampson, 97 Mass.
407 ; Feital v. Middlesex By. Co., 109
Id. 398.
But the fact that one works gratuitously does not make it a work of
"charity": McGrath v. Merwin, 112
Mass. 467. And in State v. Goff, 20
Ark. 289, it was held that where a person was too poor and had no implement

of his own with which to cut his grain,
which was wasting from over-ripeness,
could borrow none till Saturday evening, had swapped work with his neighbors during the week, hired a man to
cut his own grain Sunday, it was not a
work of "necessity."
A person cannot lawfully travel on
Sunday for the purpose of supplying
fresh meat to marketmen whom his master has agreed to supply therewith ; although he could not do this in addition
to his other work on Monday morning,
and his master by reason of illness is
unable to do it himself: Jones v. Inhabitants of Andover, 10 Allen 18.
One who travels on Sunday to ascertain whether a house which he has hired
and into which he intends to move the
next day, has been cleaned, is not
travelling from "necessity" : Smith v.
Boston 4- M. By., 120 Mass. 490; s. c.
21 Am. Rep. 538.
The cleaning up of a wheelpit on Sunday for the purpose of preventing the
stoppage on a week day of mills which
employed many hands, is not a work of
"necessity"
or "charity " : McGrath
v. Merwin, supra. And where a contract of hire of a horse and carriage on
Sunday was indefinite as to time, distance and use, the carrying of a young
lady home who had been attending a religious meeting during the day, will not
render the contract legal : Tillock v.
Webb, 56 Me. 100 ; and see Patt v.
Wright, 30 Ind. 476.
"ORDINARY
CALLING,"
"BusINsEss,"
&c.-All of the English cases
carefully distinguish between contracts
which are of the "ordinary calling" of
the parties, and such as are not in the
"ordinary calling."
The former made
upon Sunday are void ; the latter not.
This distinction is based upon the words
of the English statute of Charles II.,
which prohibits only work of one's "ordinary calling."
And contracts not
within this prohibition have always been
held valid there: Drury v. Defontaine, 1
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Taunt 131: Fennell v. Ridler, 5 B. &
C. 406. Where the statute merely prohibits the exercise of business or work of
one's "ordinary calling," one party cannot sue on the contract made by him on
Sunday in the exercise of his ordinary
calling, even if it be not within the
"ordinary calling" of the other, and the
parties meet on that day at the request of
the latter: Hazard v. Day, 14 Allen 487.
But where the contract is made in the
"ordinary calling" of one party, the
other may sue if it was not within his
own ", ordinary calling," and lie did not
know, when he entered it, that it was
within the "ordinary calling" of the defendant: Bloxsome v. Williams, 3 Barn.
& C. 232; s. c. 1 C. & P. 294.
The party seeking to impeach a contract because made on Sunday, must show
that it was done by a person in the exercise of the business of his "ordinary
calling:" Mills v. Williams, 16 S. C.
593; Hellamsv.AAbercombie, 15 Id. 110.
Where a farmer, a part of whose ordinary business was the purchase and cultivation of land, bought a tract of land
on Saturday and agreed to consummate
the trade on the next day, by signing the
necessary papers, and did sign a note for
the purchase-money on that day ; held,
that the contract was illegal: 31organv.
Bailey, 59 Ga. 683.
The loaning of money on Sunday is
"business," within the statute, and presumptively illegal: Troewert v. Decker,
51 Wis. 46. And the execution and delivery of a promissory note : Allen v.
Deming, 14 N. H. 133.
Where a town board is authorized to
issue bonds in aid of a railway, only
upon the presentation of a petition therefor, signed by a certain number of taxpayers of the town, the procuring and
affixing such signatures on Sunday,
is "business" and is unlawful, and confers no authority upon the supervisors to
issue bonds DeForth v. Wis. 4-c., Ry.,
52 Wis. 320.
But the execution of a mortgage is not
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the exercise ofone's "ordinary calling:"
Hellamsv. Abercombie, 15 S. C. 110. Nor
is an agreement by an attorney to settle
a client's affairs, by which he incurs personal responsibility, his " ordinary calling:" Peate v. Dicken, 5 Tyr. 116; s. c.
3 Dowl. P. 0. 171. And a contract of
hiring between a farmer and a laborer
for a year and a day is valid: Rex v.
Whitnash, 7 Barn. & C. 596. And in
Scarfe v. 3forgan, 4 Mees. & W. 270, it
was held, that where a mare was sent to
a farmer to be covdred by his stallion,
the case was held not to be within the
statute prohibiting the exercise of one's
"ordinary calling."
The simple making of a contract is not
embraced in the prohibition of " common
labor:" Horacev. Keebler, 5 Neb. 358 ;
Johnson v. Brown, 13 Kan. 529 ; Bloom
v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 388.
WiEN"CONTRACT DEEMED MADE ON

SuNDAY.-In some of the New England
States, Sunday, or the first day of the
week, begins at sunset on Saturday eveningand ends the same time the next day:
2 Bour. Dict. 559, 14th ed. In other
parts of the United States, it commences
at 12 o'clock on the night between Saturday and Sunday, and ends twenty-four
hours later. See Huidekoper v. Cotton,
3 Watts (Pa.) 56; Kilgor v. Miles, 6
Gill& J. (Md.) 268.
In Nason v. Dinsmore, 34 Me. 391, it
was held that a contract proved to have
been made on Sunday is not thereby
rendered invalid unless it be also proved
that it was made before sunset. The
presumption is that it was made on that
part of the day on which it was lawful to
do it: Hiller v. Enqlish, 4 Strobh. 486.
In C6nnecticut, the Lord's day has been
defined as continuing from daybreak to
the closing of daylight on Sunday: Fox
v. Abel. 2 Conn. 251 ; see, also, Tracy v.
.Tenks, 15 Pick. 465.
Where A. bought a quantity of shingles
on Sunday, and at the same time gave a
note for part payment, and he permitted
the shingles to remain with the seller for
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about a month, Held, that the contract
was complete on Sunday, and void:
Allen v. Deming, 14 N. H. 133.
A letter written Saturday, left by the
writer on Sunday with a request to carry
it to the post-office Monday, may be the
medium of accepting a prior proposition
from the person to whom it is addressed,
and thus closing a lawful contract dating
from Monday, the time when the letter
was posted in pursuance of the Sunday
request: Bryant v. Booze, 55 Ga. 439.
Where a contract for an exchange of
horses, made on Saturday, included the
discharge of a debt due from one of
the parties to the other, but the purchaser
of the horse took possession of it Sunday.
Held, that there was such a consummation of the contract on Saturday as made
it valid : Peake v. Conlan, 43 Iowa 297.
Where goods are selected and set apart
and the prices agreed upon on Sunday,
but, by the contract, they are not to be
delivered till the next day, and they are
not delivered till then, the transaction
can not be avoided as a sale made on
Sunday: Rosenblattv. Townsley, 73 Mo.
536.
Payments made on Sunday and not
returned, but allowed on a final accounting, will not avoid the contract on which
they were received as one made in.violation of the Sunday law: Lamore v.
Frisbie, 42 Mich. 186.
WHAT
CONTRACTS VOID. - The
ground upon which courts have refused
to sustain actions on contracts made in
contravention of statutes for the observance of Sunday, is the elementary principle that one who has himself participated
in a violation of law cannot be permitted
to assert in a court of justice any right
founded upou or growing out of the
illegal transaction: Cransonv. Goss, 107
Mass. 439; Ellis v. Hammond, 57 Ga.
179. Each party is in pari delicto, and
no relief can be granted because it was
made by one of them in the exercise of
his common avocation: Berry v. Planters'
Bank, 3 Tenn. Ch. 69.

In Kansas, a contract made on any day
to perform any kind of labor on Sunday,
works of necessity, &c., excepted, is void;
but a contract made on Sunday to perform labor on any other day, is valid:
Johnson v. Brown, 13 Kan. 529.
The owner cannot recover compensation for the use of a horse for a pleasure
drive on Sunday: Nodine v. Doherty, 46
Barb. 59; Stewart v. Davis, 31 Ark.
518. In any case where the hiring is
uncalled for, either by necessity or
charity, the contract is void: Wheden
v. Chappel, 8 R. I. 230 ; Smith v. Rollins, 11 Id. 464.
A common carrier's liability for carrying live stock is not lessened by reason
of their being received or carried on Sunday: Phila., 4-c.,
Ry. v. Lehman, 56 Md.
209 ; see, also, Opshal v. Judd, 30 Minn.
126.

A contract for the sale and warranty
of a horse on Sunday is void: Fennell v.
Ridler, 5 B. & C. 405. And a loan of
money on Sunday is void and cannot be
enforced, whether in writing, verbal, or
implied: Header v.. White, 66 Me. 90;
_Fnn v. Donahue, 35 Conn. 216.
In Day v. McAllister, 15 Gray 433,
it was held that a contract made in violation of the Sunday law is absolutely
void.
A musician cannot recover for his services at a beer garden on Sunday: Bernard v. Liipping, 32 Mo. 3(1.
An action will not lie for the conversion of a chattel, sold and delivered by
the plaintiff to the defendant in exchange
for another chattel on Sunday, and retained by defendant afterwards, notwithstanding the return by the plaintiff of
the chattel for which it was exchanged
and his demand for a corresponding return by defendant: Myers v. Meinrath,
101 Mass. 366.
The performance of any work on Sunday being expressly prohibited, any contract having for its consideration, or part
of it, the doing of work on that day, cannot be enforced: Saxe v. Arnold, 14

SWANN v. SWANN.
B. Mon. 287; see Pate v. 1 right, 30
Ind. 476; Sumner v. Jones, 24 Vt. 317;
Smith v. Sparrow, 4 Bling. 84.
Whrce there is a contract to publish
an "ad." in the Sunday edition of a
paper for a year, it will not be presumed
that the contract contemplated any labor
to be done on Sunday: Sheffield v. Balmer, 52 Mo. 474. See Nason v. Dinsmore,
34 1Ic. 391. But in Smith y. Wilcox,
25 Barb. 341, it was held that a contract
to publish an "ad." in a paper issued
on Sunday is an agreement to do an act
prohibited by the statute relative to
servile labor on that day, and the price
cannot be recovered. This case was
affirmed in 24 N. Y. 353. But under
the laws of 1871, such contracts are now
legal.
The rescission of a contract is as much
a matter of business as the making of it,
and is void: Benedict v. Bachelder, 24
Mich. 425 ; 9 Am. R. 130. See Merritt v. Robinson, 35 Ark. 483.
A city ordinance wheli gives Jews the
privilege of trading on Sunday, but denies it to others, is unconstitutional : City
of Shreveport v. Levy, 26 La. Ann. 671.
But in Johns v. State, 78 Ind. 332, it
was held that a statute against the desecration of the Sabbath, which provides
that "nothing herein contained shall he
construed to affect such as conscientiously observe the seventh day of the
week as Sabbath," is not unconstitutional, as granting certain citizens privileges, &c., which shall not belong to all
persons.
Sunday contracts are void, and the
burden of proof showing that the case
falls within some of the exceptions of the
statutes, is on the party claiming it:
&ayre v. Wheeler, 32 Iowa 559. See
Albrechtv. State, 8 Tex. App. 313. Two
joined in one complaint for doing work on
Sunday may be jointly convicted, upon
proof of a joint act in violation of the
statute : Commonwealth v. Sampson, 97
Mass. 407.
(For instances of negotiable paper,
VOL. XXXIII.-50

void because issued on Sunday, see subtitle "NEGOTIABLE PAPER," infra, p.
394.)
WHAT

CONTRACTS

VALID.-Where

the contract is fully executed on Sunday,
and the property passes, the sale is nevertheless valid: Golfrey v. Greene, 44
Me. 25.
A contract made on Sunday by the
overseers of the town for the relief of a
sick pauper, is valid: Aldrich v. In abs.
lBlackstone, 128 Mass. 148. And money
paid on Sunday and rtained afterwards,
discharges debt: Johnson v. Willis, 7
Gray 164.
A deed though signed and acknowledged on Sunday, if delivered on another
day is valid, whatever may be the effect
on the acknowledgment: Love v. Wells,
25 Ind. 503.
A deed executed on Sunda 3 cannot for
that reason be avoided by a third party,
who is a stranger to the transaction,
claiming by a subsequent levy: G4reene
v. Godfrey, 44 Me. 25. And where a
deed is executed on Sunday, but by the
procurement of the grantor, dated upon
the preceding day, he cannot assert the
invalidity against a subsequent bonofide
holder: Love v. Wells, supra.
In Breitenman's Appeal, 55 Penn. St.
183,it was held that any instrument which
does not take effect till delivery is not
void because signed on Sunday.
A will executed on Sunday is valid:
Bennett v. Brooks, 9 Allen 118; Breitenman's Appeal, supra.
Bail-bond executed on Sunday is binding on the sureties: Watts v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush (Ky.) 309. And a bond
void because issued on Sunday, may be
used as an admission of a liability: Lea
v. Hlopkins, 7 Penn. St. 492.
An agreement to settle an action may
be made on Sunday: Shank v. Shoemaker,
18 N. Y. 488. And the execution of a
release by u creditor to an assignee,
under a voluntary assignment, by delivery on Sunday is not void, not being
labor, business or work of one's ordinary
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calling: Allen v. Gardiner,7 R. I. 22;
see Hazard v. Day, 14 Allen 487;
Tucker v. West, 29 Ark. 386.
A bill of sale of personal property,
drawn and executed on Monday, is not
void by reason of an account of stock
having been taken on Sunday: Luebbering v. Oberkoetter, I Mo. App. 393.
And the fact that the indebtedness was
for liquors sold on Sunday contrary to law,
is no bar to an action on account stated,
provided the account was not stated on
Sunday: Melchoir v. McCarty, 31 Wis.
253.
The statute does not apply to the proceedings of business meetings of benevoient societies held on that day : Corrigan
v. Young Mens', 4-c., Society, 65 Barb.
357.
A contract for the sale of property
made upon Sunday, is not for that reason void. To bring a transaction within
the statute which declares that no person
shall expose for sale any wares, &c., on
Sunday, clear proof of its violation
must he produced. A private sale of
property not "exposed to sale," is not
within its provisions: Eberle v. .fehrbach,
55 N. Y. 682 ; see Melvin v. Easly, 42
N. C. 356.
If goods are sold and delivered to A.
and B. on the Lord's day, the sale being
induced by the false representations of
A. on a previous day, and subsequently,
not on Sunday, the seller demands the
price of A., and he promises to pay it,
this amounts to a sale to him, and he is
liable for the price : Winchell v. Carey,
115 Mass. 560.
A contract for the transportation of
property on Sunday is valid : Merrittv.
Earle, 29 N. Y. 121 ; see Carroll v.
Staten Id. Ry. Co., 58 N. Y. 126.
In 11leriweatherv. Smith, 44 Ga. 542,
the court said : "A clear distinction is
made by the authorities between a suit
to enforce a promise or undertaking entered into on Sunday, and a suit on a
contract made on Sunday for work and
labor, and for the doing anything, where

the thing to be done is afterwards performed by the party. It would be a
fraud in one who has received the consideration of a contract on a week day,
to set up the invalidity of the contract
because made on Sunday. He reaffirms
the contract by receiving the consideration." See Dickenson v. Richmond, 97
Mass. 45 ; Blood v. Bates, 31 Vt. 147.
In order to render the contract void, it
must appear that the party seeking to
enforce it, had some voluntary agency in
consummating it on Sunday: Sargeant
v. Butts, 21 Vt. 99.
In Dinsmore v. N. Y. Board of Police,
12 Abb. N. C. 436, an injunction was
granted to restrain the board of police
from interfering with an express company's transportation of freight between
states of the United States, but denied as
to domestic matters, that is as to goods to
be received and delivered within -the
city of New York: See Adams Express
v. N. Y. Board Police, 65 How. Pr. 72.
NEGOTIABLE PAPER-WHEin

VOID.

-A promissory note, made on Sunday,
is, as between the original parties, void.
Pope v. Linn, 50 Me. 83; State Cap.
Bank v. Thompson, 42 N. H. 369 ; Bank
of C. v. Mayberry, 48 Me. 198. But if
delivered on another day, it is validGoss v. Whitney, 24 Vt. 187 ; King v.
Fleming, 72 Ill. 21 ; Hilton v. Houghton,
35 Me. 143; Bank of C. v. Mayberry,
supra. But in Parker v. .itts, 73 Ind.
597, it was held that the execution of a
promissory note, as surety on Sunday,
though delivered by the principal on a
week day to the payee, who had no
knowledge that the note had been so
signed by the surety is void. See Chrisman v. Tuttle, 59 Ind. 155 ; Saltmarsh v.
Tuthill, 13 Ala. 390.
The consideration of a note given for
an injury done on the Lord's day to a
horse and carriage hired on that day for
any purpose than that of necessity or
charity, is unlawful: Tillock v. Webb,
56 Me. 100.
A note made on Sunday is not void at
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common law, and in a suit on a foreign note, any foreign statute invalidating it must be proved : O'Rourke v.
O'Rourke, 43 Mich. 59.
And a note executed on Sunday is
good in the hands of an innocent holder
before maturity: State Cap. Bank v.
Thompson, supra. And a bill of exchange
under like circumstances is valid : BegAnd a
bie v. Levi, 1 0. & J. 180.
note signed and delivered on Sunday.
but dated on week day, is valid in the
hands of a bonafide holder without notice
of the defect: Bank of C. v. .layberry,
supra; Knox v. Clifford, 48 Wis. 651 ;
Cranson v. Goss, 107 Mass. 439 ; Vinton
v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287 ; Ball v. Powers,
62 Ga. 757. The making and delivering
on a secular day of a promissory note,
dated to take effect on a subsequent Sunday, is not work or labor prohibited
bythe statute: Stacy v. Kemp, 97 Mass.
166.
It is no ground for arresting judgment in an action on a promissory note,
that it bears date on Sunday: Hilly. Dunham, 7 Gray 543 ; see Stevens v. Wood,
127 Mass. 123.
SUBSEQUENT RATrFCATION. -- The
rule is that as between the parties a contract made in violation of the Sunday
law, is void and is incapable of being
ratified: Pope v. Linn, 50 Me. 83; Day
v. McAllister, 15 Gray 433; Stevens v.
WIod, 127 Mass. 123; see also Parker
v. Pitts, 73 Ind. 598.
A contract for the transmission of a
telegraph dispatch on Sunday is void,
and the retention of the dispatch and the
consideration paid by the sender does not
constitute a ratification: Rogers v. W. U.
Tel. Co., 78 Ind. 169.
A Sunday horse trade can not be ratified on a week day; and if possession is
given, the horse can be reclaimed, unless
a new contract is made with mutual
assent: Vinfieldv. Dodge, 45 Mich. 355.
A note illegal because issued on Sunday
is incapable of ratification: Stevens v.
Wood, supra.
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Part payments made on Sunday will
not take a debt out of the -statute of
limitations: Clapp v. Hale, 112 Mass.
368. And a subsequent promise to pay
a debt, whether express or implied if
made on Sunday, does not take the debt
out of the statute: Bumgardner v.
But contra,
Taylor, 28 Ala. 687.
Tiomas v. Hunter, 29 Md. 406 ; Beardsley v. Hall, 36 Conn. 270.
Where the terms of a contract only are
agreed upon on Sunday, and subsequently executed it may be enforced:
Butler v. Lee, 11 Ala. 885.
The mere fact that a person borrowing
money retains and converts it to his own
use, does not raise an implied promise
binding in law. Troewert v. Decker, 51
Wis. 46. In Bradley v. Rea, 14 Allen
20, affirmed 103 Mass. 188, it was held
that if a bargain is made on Sunday for
the sale of goods, which are accordingly
delivered and accepted by the purchaser
on Monday, the vendor may maintain an
action to recover the value of the goods,
upon implied assumpsit; but the price
fixed on Sunday will not be binding, nor
will either be bound by any warranty
made on that day. And in Love v. Wells,
25 Ind. 503, it was held that a contract
void only because executed on Sunday
constitutes an exception to the general
rule that void contracts are not susceptible of ratification : Sargeantv. Butts, 21
Vt. 99. See Van Hoven v. Irish, 3
McCrary C. C. 443; Heller v. Crawford, 37 1nd. 279; .lelchoir v. McCarthy,
31 Wis. 252.
Where a promissorynote made by two,
one of whom signed it on Sunday, was,
on a subsequent day delivered by one of
the makers to the payee who was ignorant of the fact that it had been signed on
Sunday, it was held that such delivery
was a subsequent ratification and made
it valid: King v. Fleming, 72 Ill. 21.
Where S. sold a horse to J. on Sunday,
for which J. gave a note, and afterwards made two payments upon the
note, and retained the horse without
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offering to return the same, Held to
amount to a ratification, and that S.
was entitled to recover for the balance
of the note: Suner v. .Jones, 24 Vt.

connected with the cause of action, as
to .prevent his maintaining the suit:
McGrath v. Merwin, 112 Mass. 467;
see also Ladd v. Rogers, 11 Allen 209
Simpson v. NVicholls, 3 Mees. & W. 240;
317. See also fiarrison v. Colton, 31
Gunderson v. Richardson, 56 Ia. 66.
Iowa 16 ; Merrillv. Douns, 41 N. H. 72.
And in Gregg v. Wyman, 4 Cush. 322,
TORT GROWING OUT OF SUNDAY
CONTRACT.-The general principle is it was held that if the owner of a horse
that courts of justice will not assist a
knowingly lets him, on the Lord's day,
person who has participated in a trans- to be driven to a particular place, but
action forbidden by statute to assert not for " necessity or charity," and the
hirer injures the horse by immoderate
rights growing out of it, or to relieve
himself from the consequences of his own driving, the owner cannot maintain
an action against him for such injuries,
illegal act. Whether the form of action
is in contract or in tort, the test in each
although occasioned in going to a different
case is whether, where all the parties are place, and beyond the limits specified
disclosed, the action appears to be
in the contract. But the case of Gregg
founded in violation of law in which
v. Wyman, was directly overruled in
the plaintiff has taken part: Hall v.
Hall v. Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251.
Said the court: "It appears to us,
Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251.
Thus, the
sale or exchange of horses consummated
upon principal and authority, that an
on Sunday is void, and no action will action of tort for the conversion of a
lie on the waranty: Finley v. Quirk, 9
horse, by driving it beyond t.he place
Minn. 195; Murphy v. Simpson, 14 B.
agreed in the illegal contract of letting
Mon. 419 ; Lyon v. Strong, 6 Vt. 219;
and hiring, is not founded on that contract. And we think that it is equally
Robeson v. French, 12 Met. 24.
And a person who travels on Sunday
clear, that the contract need not be
in violation of the Lord's day act can- shown by the plaintiff, and forms no
not maintain an action against a town
part of his cause of action. * ** The
for a defect in a highway, or against
wrong committed by the defendants, for
the proprietors of a street railway, in
which they are now sued, was not a
whose cars he is a passenger, for an
breach of the illegal contract by which the
injury to himself from their negligence,
plaintiffput his property into their hands ;
because his own fault in illegally trav- nor is the ground of this action an abuse
elling on the Lord's day necessarily conof the possession which they had thus actributed to the injury : Bosworth v.
quired by his consent, but is a direct inSwansey, 10 Met. 363; Jones v. Andover, vasion of the plaintiff's general right of
10 Allen 18; Stanton v. Metropolitan property, wholly outside of any contract
between the parties by the wrongful drivRy. Co., 14 Allen 485.
An action of tort will not lie, if to ing of the horse beyond the place agreed
establish it the plaintiff requires aid from upon, and thus assuming control of the
property for their own benefit, without
or is under the necessity of showing or
any authority or license from the owner."
depending uponI an illegal Sunday conThe doctrine of the above case is sustract: Smith v. Rollins, 11 R. I. 464;
tained by Woodman v. Hubbard, 25 N.
Whelden v. Chappel, 8 R. I. 230. And
where the plaintiff sustained personal inH. 67 ; .lortan v. Gloster, 46 Me. 520.
juries from the negligence of the defendBut in Parker v. Latner, 60 Id. 528;
ant while assisting them in their work on
s. c. 11 Am. R. 210, it was held that an
Sunday, it was held that his illegal act
action will not lie zo recover damages
in working on Sunday was so inseparably
arising from the immoderate driving of a
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horse during a pleasure drive on the
Lord's day, for which he was hired.
But if the hirer of a horse injures the
property, or suffers it to be injured
through his negligence, the owner may
recover, although the contract be void :
Xodine v. Doherty, 46 Barb. 59 ; see
Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. 121 ; Carroll
v. Staten Id. By. Co., 58 N. Y. 126 ;
Bertholfv. O'Reilly, 8 Hun 16 ; affirmed
18 Abb. L. 3. 389; Stewart v. Davis,
31 Ark. 518 ; see also, Dodson v. Hairis,
10 Ala. 566.
If a person while unlawfully travelling

on Sunday is injured by a dog, the act of
travelling is not a contributory cause
of the injury, and he may recover: White
v. Lang, 128 Mass. 598. And in O'Shea
v. Kohn, a recent case in the New York
Supreme Court, published in 17 Chicago
Leg. News 15, Sept. 20, 1884, the court
held that the law would not permit a person, by meafis of false representations,
to obtain the goods or property of another
and escape liability upon the fact that the
wrong was perpetrated on Sunday.
CHAnrEs L. BILLxGs.
Chicago.

Supreme Court of California.
HAGERTY v. POWERS.
A parent who wilfully and negligently permits his son of eleven years of age to
have in his possession a loaded pistol, whereby the boy injures the infant child of
another, is not liable in damages therefor.
BlmnicK, J., dissents.

IN bane. Appeal from the Superior Court of the county of
Sacramento.
Grove L. Johnson and Jones & Martin, for appellant.

Fllwood Bruner and S. -P. Scanaker, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Ross, J.-The question in this case is whether the defendant,
who, according to the averments of the complaint, "wilfully, carelessly and negligently suffered, permitted, countenanced and

allowed" his son of eleven years of age to have in his possession a
loaded pistol, which pistol the boy afterwards so carelessly used and
handled as to shoot the infant child of the plaintiff, is liable in
damages therefor. We have been cited to no case, controlled by

the principles of the common law, that holds that the action, under
such circumstances, can be maintained.

It seems, that under the

civil law it may be; and such an action was lately sustained by
the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in the case entitled M1arionneaux
v. Brugier,reported in the sixteenth volume of the Reporter, page
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208. Pothier, in his work on Obligations, says: "The doctrine
that fathers and others shall be responsible for the acts of children
under their care, which it was in their power to prevent, appears
highly reasonable; but I am not aware of any case in which it is
adopted in the English law." Volume 2, page 34.
In Tift v. Tifft, 4 Denio 177, a minor daughter of the defendant, in her father's absence, and without his authority or approval,
wilfully set his dog, not ordinarily a vicious animal, upon the
plaintiff's hog, which was bitten and killed; and the court held that
the father was not, but the child was, liable in damages. To the
same effect are a number of cases cited in Schouler, Dom. Rel.
sect. 263, from which he deduces the rule that a father is not liable
in damages for the torts of his child, committed without his knowledge, consent or sanction, and not in the course of his employment
of the child.
Under this rule, it is quite clear that the averments of the complaint do not fix upon the defendant any liability for the damages
suffered by the plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.
MYRICK, J., dissenting.-I dissent.

As the complaint alleges
that the father wilfully, carelessly and negligently countenanced his
child in having the pistol, it is sufficient to show a cause of action.
The principal case is an interesting
addition to the scanty literature upon the
liability of the father for the torts of his
minor children. The case of Hoverson
v. Noker, Sup. Ct. of Wisconsin, 23 Am.
L. Reg. (N. S.) 670, is somewhat similar in its facts. In this case the father
was held liable for injuries received by
the plaintiff, caused by the frightening
of her horse by the two boys of the defendant, who shouted and fired pistols as
she passed their father's premises. In
order to connect the defendant with the
acts of his sons it was held proper to
show that such acts had often been done
by the boys in the presence of their father
prior to the day when the plaintiff was
injured. In delivering the opinion of the
court, TAYLOR, J., said: "If the father
permitted his young sons to shout, use
abusive language, and dischargefire-arms
at persons who were passing along the

highway in front of his house, he permitted that to be done upon his premises
which in its nature was likely to result in
damage to those passing; and when an
injury did happen from that cause, he
was not only morally hut legally responsible for the damage done. If a parent
permits his very young children to become a source of damage to those who
pass the highway in front of his house,
he is as much liable for the injury as
though he permitted them to erect some
frightful or dangerous object near the
highway which would frighten passing
teams; and in such case he cannot screen
himself by saying that he did not in
words order the erection to be made."
The case of Beedy v. Reding, 16 Mfe.
362, may be profitably consulted in this
connection. In this case the minor sons
of the defendant, being at the same time
members of his family, with the defend-

ASKEW v. LA CYGNE EXCHANGE BANK
ant's team hauled away the plaintiff's
wood. "This (the court say) could
hardly have been done without the defendant's knowledge, if it had not his
approbation. It was his duty to have restrained them from trespassing on his
neighbor's property. Qui non prohibit
cua prohibere possit, jubet. And the
maxim may be applied with great propriety to minor children residing with
and under the control of their father."
See, also, Dunks v. Grey, 3 Fed. Rep.
862, 864 ; also, Morgan v. Thomas, 8
Exeh. 304, where the above maxim is
quoted with approval by PAKE, B.
If the above cases are correct, the
principal case can hardly be supported.
The only way in which it can be distinguished, as it seems to us, is on the ground
that the neglect of the parent was not the
proximate cause of the damage sustained
by plaintiff; but this distinction seems
illusory. Although the damage was not
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perhaps a necessary consequence of the
defendant's negligence, it was a- natural
consequence and one that any prudent
man ought to have foreseen. If we concede the above maxim to be a correct
statement of a legal principle ; if it was
the parent's duty to withhold from his
infant son so dangerous a weapon, as
would seem to be clear upon commonsense principles as well as established by
the authorities above cited, then the con
clusion seems obvious that he is responsible for the natural onsequences of his
omission to perform this duty. On principles of policy as well as upon legal
principle, it would seem that the father
ought to have been held to respond in
damages in the principal case. Still the
question is not free from difficulty, and
perhaps it may finally be settled adversely
to the opinion here expressed.
MARSHALL D. EWEn.
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A voluntary bonafide assignment of personal property, wherever situated, passes
it to the assignee at the time of the assignnient, and will have priority over subsequent lienors, provided it is not in conflict with some positive or customary law of
the state where the property may be located.
The L. bank of the state of Kansas made an assignment in that state for the benefit of its creditors of all of its personal property to J. E. M., a resident of the
same state, including a debt due to L. bank from M. bank of the state of Missouri,
payable in the latter state. The assignment conformed with the laws of Kansas,
and would have been valid had it been executed in Missouri-the assignment laws
of the two states being substantially the same. II. A., a creditor of L. bank, and
a citizen of Missouri, instituted an attachment suit against L. bank in the courts of
the latter state, and garnisheed this debt in the hands of the M. bank. J. E. M.,
the assignee of the L. bank, interposed an interplea, claiming to be the owner of
the debt. Held, that as between the attaching creditor and the assignee, the title
of the latter would prevail.

TiiE opinion of the court was delivered by
EWING, Commissioner.-The appellant, on the 27th of February
1880, brought this suit against the La Cygne Bank, a banking corporation created under the laws of the state of Kansas, and there-
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tofore doing business as such at La Cygne in that state. The suit
was by attachment, and notice of garnishment was on the same day
served on the Merchants' National Bank of Kansas City, as
garnishee.
In due time the garnishee answered, stating that at the time the
notice was served, it had in its possession the notes of several parties which had been placed in its hands by the Kansas bank as
collateral security for a debt owing by the latter to the garnishee.
After this answer was filed the respondent, Moore, as assignee
of the Kansas bank, filed his interplea claiming to be the owner
of the notes, subject only to the lien of the pledge mentioned in
the garnishee's answer.
The appellants answered to the interplea denying the claim set
up.
. The garnishee's answer was taken as true by all parties to the
suit, and the contest between the appellants and respondent was
over the surplus which it was supposed would remain in the hands
of the garnishee after the payment of the debt due to it.
The issue between the interpleader and appellants was tried by
the court, without a jury, upon the facts as agreed upon by the
parties, and which were substantially as follows: The La Cygne
Exchange Bank was a banking corporation organized under the
laws of the state of Kansas, and had been doing business as such
at La Cygne, in the county of Miami, in said state, since the year
1876. At noon, on February 25th 1880, the bank made an
assignment of all its property and effects for the benefit of all its
creditors. This assignment was made in conformity with the laws
of the state of Kansas upon that subject. Immediately upon the
making of the assignment the assignee took possession of the property and effects. The interpleader is the assignee, and undertook the execution of his trust, and all the proceedings of the
assignee subsequent to the making of the assignment bad been
in strict conformity to the laws of the state of Kansas. The property attached in the garnishee's hands had been pledged to the
garnishee bank by the debtor bank long before the assignment, as
collateral security for certain debts due by the latter to the former. The appellants were residents and citizens of Missouri; the
garnishee bank was located in Missouri, and the debt payable in
Missouri.
The laws of the state of Kansas governing assignments for the
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benefit of creditors were made part of the case, and were in allmaterial matters substantially the same as those of Missouri upon
the same subject.
The court refused to declare the law to be that upon the pleadings and evidence the interpleader could not recover, and made its
finding for the assignee (the interpleader), and rendered judgment
accordingly.
The attaching creditors took this appeal.
It will be seen that the precise legal proposition we have to
decide is this: Does a-voluntary assignment, for the benefit of all
the creditors of the assignor, made in the state of Kansas, of a debt
due from a citizen and resident of this state to the assignor, a
resident of Kansas, pass the debt to the assignee at the time of the
assignment, so as to defeat a subsequent attaching creditor of the
assignor in this state, whose attachment is issued and the debtor
of the assignor garnished, after the making of the assignment.
There has been much discussion of questions similar to this, but
it will neither be necessary or profitable to undertake a thorough
review of the conflicting adjudications.
The case of Bryan v. Brisbin, 26 Mo. 423, is similar to the one
at bar, with the important exception that in that case the deed
of assignment was in conflict with the laws of Missouri and could
not have been enforced here; while it is admitted that the assignment in the case at bar would be valid in Missouri.
In Einer v. Beste, 32 Mo. 240, the plaintiff and defendant were
both residents of Louisiana. The defendant was insolvent and had
instituted proceedings for discharge under the insolvent laws
of Louisiana. The plaintiff, by a suit of attachment in this state,
sought to obtain priority of the other creditors. After a somewhat
exhaustive review of the authorities, Judge BAY held that the
assignment was good as against this attaching creditor. The same
question was similarly decided by this court in Thurston v. Rosen-'
field, 42 Mo. 474.
In Ockeryman v. Gross, 54 N. Y. 29, it is held that a voluntary
assignment by a debtor residing in another state, valid by the laws
of that state, and not in conflict 'with any law of New York,
operates as an assignment of the debtor's property in New York,
and the assignees can hold the same against attaching creditors
of the debtor. See, also, to the same effect, 40 Barb. 465.
In Speed v. .lay, 17 Penn. St. 91, it was held that "a voluntary
VOL. XXXIII.51
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assignment made by.the owner in Maryland, who resided there,
passed property in Pennsylvania to the assignee as against an
attachment subsequent to the assignment."
The same question is similarly decided in Hanford v. Paive, 32
Vt. 442; Gatewood v. Whitlock, 9 Fla. 86; Xiller v. Kanaghan,
56 Ga. 155 ; Gregg v. Sloan, 76 Va. 497 ; Law v. Mills, 18 Penn.
St. 185; Johnson v. Sharp, 31 Ohio St. 611; May v. Wannemacher, 111 Mass. 202; Caskie v. Webster, 2 Wall. 131.
Mr. Justice STORY, in discussing the question (Story on Conflict
of Laws, sect. 411) says: "There is a marked distinction between
a voluntary conveyance by the owner, and a conveyance by mere
operation of law, in cases of bankruptcy, in invitum. * * * In
place of a voluntary conveyance of the owner, all that the legislature of a country can do, when justice requires it, is to assume the
disposition of his property in invitum. But a statutable conveyance, made under the authority of any legislature, cannot operate
on any property except that which is in its own territory. This
makes a solid distinction between a voluntary conveyance of the
owner, and an involuntary legal conveyance by the mere authority
of law. The former has no relation to place, the latter on the
contrary has the strictest relation to place." And he concludes by
saying: "It is, therefore, admitted that a voluntary assignment by
a party, according to the law of his domicile, will pass his personal
estate, whatever may be its locality, abroad as well as at home.
But it by no means follows that the same rule should govern in
cases of assignment by operation of law." See note 2 to this
-section. Such an assignment would, if valid when made, be upheld
in the state where the property is found, unless its operation is
limited or restrained by some law or policy of the latter: Hanford
v. Paine,supra; Ockerman v. Gross, supra. Burrill on Assignments, sects. 302 and 309, maintains the same general doctrine.
A contrary doctrine seems to prevail, according to some authorities cited by the appellant. One is the case of Johnson v. Parker,
67 Ky. 149, but that is virtually overruled by a much later decision
(1884) in .Atherton v. Evers et al., 20 Fed. Rep. 894, where the
general rule as referred to is maintained.
He also refers to other cases seemingly irreconcilable. But,
notwithstanding, we think it may be assumed from the weight
of authority that the true rule is, that involuntary assignments by
-operation of law do not operate beyond the territory of the state
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under the laws of which such compulsory assignment may be made;
but that voluntary, bona fide assignments of personal property,
wherever situated, pass it to the assignee at the time of the
assignment, and will have priority over subsequent leinors, provided
it is not in conflict with some positive or customary law of the state
where the property may be located.
It is admitted in this case that the assignment laws of Kansas
and Missouri are substantially similar, and that the assignment under
consideration would be valid if made in this state.
It also appears that the attaching creditor can claim no preference
over the general creditors in point of merit.
We must therefore hold that the assignee will take the property
in preference to the attaching creditor, and there is nothing in the
law nor inter-state comity which would justify the courts of this
state in holding otherwise.
The judgment below is therefore affirmed. All concur.
HouGH, 0. J.-Adopted as the opinion of the court and judgment will be entered accordingly.
Where the question involved in the
principal case has presented itself, courts
have adopted many conflicting and irreconcilable theories as to the principles
which should govern their decisions.
Many have held to the notion that in all
cases the law of the domicile of the owner,
lex domicilii, should control the disposition of all personal property, whether
corporeal movables or choses in action,
while others have maintained that the law
of the place where the property is actually situated, lex rei situs, determined its
transfer.
The rule that the law of the forum,
lexfori, is the test of its validity, has
been adopted in numerous cases. And
in cases of debt another theory has been
advanced, that is, that the law of the
place of payment is the criterion, because
that is where the debt will ultimately go.
See Wharton on Conflict of Laws (2d
ed.),
359 et seq. ; Story on Conflict of
Laws (8th ed.), et se. 385. ; Burrill
on Assignments (4thed.), 301 et seq.
As a general rule, personal property

has no locality, no situs, but follows the
person of the owner. It is, therefore,
governed in its transfer or disposition by
the law of the domicile of its owner, by
the law of the place where the transfer is
made, without regard to the locality
where it may be actually situated, so that
if a sale be valid where made, it is valid
everywhere. 1 Kames's Eq., p. 355, c.
8, s. 3 ; Story on Conflict of Laws (8th
ed.), p. 546. Though this is not a universal rule, but subject to certain -wellfounded exceptions. The question depends largely upon the manner of the
transfer, the nature of the property and
the effect upon the rights of citizens in
the place where the property is situated.
One exception to the rule is, that an
assignment is not valid of property in
another state, as against citizens of that
state, if it is repugnant to the policy or
positive institutions of such other state.
This exception rests on the ground that
there is no comity which requires a state
to enforce transfers which are detrimental
to her own citizens. The cases generally
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sustain this exception, yet, as will be is likewise against sustaining the exseen, a few repudiate it, because of the ception. The assignment was volunnarrow and illiberal policy which it is tary, and made in Maryland, by a
citizen of Maryland, and good by
supposed supports it. 2 Kent Com.455.
Caskie v. lebster, 2 Wall. Jr. 131, does the laws of that state. It included
not sustain the exception. This case a debt due from a citizen of Pennstates the law to be, that the legal situs sylvania to the assignor. This debt
of movables follows the domicile of the was attached by a Pennsylvania credowner, and that the law of the actual itor of the assignor before the assignee
situs protects the claims of creditors domi- got possession of it. GiBsox, C. J.,
ciled there only against transfers by who gave the opinion, said : "The
operation of law. In Caskie v. Webster, legal situs follows the domicile of the
the assignment was made in Virginia, by owner, and the law of the actual situs
a citizen of that state. The transfer was protects the claims of domiciled credgood by the laws of Virginia, and included itors there only against transfer by
a debt as one item of his property due to operation of law. * * * Granting, for
the sake of argument, that the actual
the assignor from a citizen of Pennsylvania. Tested by the laws of Pennsyl- situs of the debt in question was in
vania, the assignment was invalid. Pennsylvania, the voluntary assignment
Before the assignee could collect this of it in Maryland, by the owner of it,
debt, a Pennsylvania creditor of the vested it in the trustees there against
assignor attached it. It was held that their creditors here. The assignment
the assignment effectually transferred tile was as operative to transfer the prodebt to the assignee. GazER, J.,in giving perty in the first instance, as it would
the opinion, said: A debt is a mere in- have been had it been executed by a
corporeal right. It has no situs, and fol- citizen of -Pennsylvania." In answer
lows the person of the creditor. A vol. to the objection that the assignment
untary assignment of it by the creditor, should not be sustained because it did
not conform to the laws of Pennsylvania,
which is valid by the laws ofhis domicile,
* * * will operate as a transfer of
the chief justice observed : "The legal
the debt, which should be regarded presumption is, that it was intended to
be performed at the place where it was
in all places. In America, bankrupt or
made ; and, as there is nothing to rebut
insolvent assignments by operation of
law, have not been considered as subject it, the law of the contract is the law of
to this rule. But I know of no other the place of its origin. * * * The lex
contractus determines the validity of
established exception to the general rule, loci
that a transfer of personal property, the contract ; the lex fori controls the
See Law v. Mills, 18 Penn.
valid by the laws of the owner's domi- remedy."
cile, is valid everywhere. I know there St. 185. From the language of the
are some cases to be found in which the court in the preceding decisions it will
rule declared is, that
courts of some states of this union have be seen that tile
decided that a voluntary assignment for the legal situs of personal property folthe benefit of breditors, valid by the laws lows the domicile of the owner, and
of the creditor's domicile, will be dis- determines the validity of the assignregarded where it is prejudicial to the ment, except where the transfer is made
interests of the attaching creditors in by operation of. law. Nor do these decisions rest upon the distinction between
other states, or invalid by the laws of
the state where the debt or the property mere choses in action and corporeal
movables, as claimed in Guillander v.
is attached."
Howell, 35 N. Y. 675. But if the forSpeed v. Mday, 17 Penn. St. 91.
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eign assignment is repugnant to the legislation of the state where the property
is situated it will "not be sustained :
.Philsoa v. Barnes, 50 Penn. St. 230.
In this case the assignment was made in
Maryland, and included a debt due from
a resident of Pennsylvania to the assignor. The debt was attached before
the assignee got possession of it. The
statute of Pennsylvania required such
assignments to be recorded and notice to
The
be given.
This was not done.
court held as the assignment contravened
the policy of the statute it could not be
sustained against an attachment of one
of its own citizens. There seems to be
no conflict in the cases on this proposition.
If a foreign assignment, though valid,
in the owner's domicile where made, of
either corporeal movables or choses in action, is repugnant to the positive legislation of the state where the property is
situated, there is no good reason why it
should be sustained, if it is prejudicial to
the interests of citizens of the latter state.
To uphold it would be to ignore the publicpolicy of the state as evinced by the
legislature. Air. Justice PORTER clearly
states the reasons for this rule in the
leading case of Oliver v. Townes, 2 Mart.
N. S. (La.) 93, 102. See, further Norris
v. Mumford, 4 Mart. 0. S.20 ; Durnford
v. Brooks, 3 Id. 222, 225 ; Raamsey v.
Stevenson, 5 Id. 23 ; Fisk v. Chandler,
7 Id. 24. Mr. Justice STORY, in referring to this principle, says that no one
can seriously doubt that it is competent
for any state to adopt such a r:ule in its
own legislation, since it has perfect jurisdiction over all property, personal as well
as real, within its own territorial limits.
Nor can such a rule, made for the
benefit of innocent purchasers and creditors, be deemed justly open to the
reproach of being founded in a narrow
or selfish policy. "But bow far," continued Judge STORY, "any court of
justice ought, upon its own general authority, to impose such a limitation,
independently of positive legislation, has

ET AL.

405

been thought to admit of more serious
question, since the doctrine which it unfolds aims a direct blow at the soundness
of the policy on which the general rule
that personal property has no locality, is
itself founded :" Story on Conft. of Laws
390. See section 380 of
(8th ed.),
Story on Conflict of Laws, where Lord
LOUGHBOROUGH is quoted

as saying:

"It is a clear proposition, not only of
the law of England, but of every country in the world where law has the semblance of science, that personal property
has no locality ; the meaning of that is,
not that personal property has no visible
locality, but that it is subject to that law
which governs the person of the owner.
With respect to the disposition of it, with
respect to the transmission of it, either
by succession or by the act of the party,
it follows the law of the person." See
Freke v. Carbery, L. R., 16 Eq. 466,
where Lord SELBORNE declares that the
above passage is simply a translation
into English of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam. Lord C. J. ABBOTT'S
views seem to accord fully with those of
Lord LouGmnouGH, as above given,

for he says: "Personal property has no
locality, and even with respect to that,
it is not correct to say that the law of
England gives way to the law of a foreign country, but that it is a part of the
law of England that personal property
should be distributed according to the
jus domictii:" Birthwdstle v. Vardill,
5 B. & C. 438, 451 ; s. c. 9 Bligh
32-88 ; 2 Cl. & F. 571. For further
authority on the general proposition, see
Story on Conflict of Laws (8th ed.),
380 et seq., and notes.
But whatever may be urged against
the soundness of the exception to the
general rule, it has been admitted, in
terms, by so many jurists, that its existence as part of the law cannot well be
denied. The states adhere to the principle for the purpose of protecting their
own citizens; it is never invoked for
the benefit of citizens of other states.
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And whether the conflict is with a statutory enactment, or contravenes the pub-

lic policy as reflected by the judiciary,
it is not easy to perceive a distinction.
Chief Justice REDFIELD, in Hanford
v. Paine, 32 Vt. 442, admitted the general rule to be that, if good, according
to the laws of the owner's domicile, they
will have the effect to pass all the personal property of the assignor wherever
situated, "unless their operation is limited or restrained by some local law or
policy of the state where the same is
See Richmondville Mfg. Co.
situated."
v. Prall, 9 Conn. 487 ; Sanderson v.
Bradford, 10 N. H. 260; Atwood v.
Protection Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 555.
The Massachusetts courts have, in
many instances, repudiated the notion
of giving effect to such assignments
where they operate against their local
legislation, or to defeat attachments
made by their own citizens: Zipcey v.
Thompson, 1 Gray 243 ; Carter v. Sibley, 4 Met. 298; Edwards v. M3fitchel,
I Gray 239 ; Ingraham v. Geyer, 13
Mass. 146. This case was followed in
Fox v. Adams, 5 Greenleaf (Me.) 245 ;
Mfeans v. ilapgood, 19 Pick. 107. But
Chief Justice SiuAw, in giving the opinion in the last case referred to, (Fox v.
Adams, supra), thus: "This case has
been repeatedly doubted in this state."
See further, Taylor v. Columbia Ins.
Co., 14 Allen (Mass.) 353; Osborn v.
Adams, 18 Pick. 245 ; Fall River Iron
Works v. Croade, 15 Id. 11 ; Bradford
v. Tappan, 11 Id. 76 ; Ward v. Lamson,
6 Id. 358 ; Swan v. Crafts, 124 Mass.
453; May v. W1rannemacher, 111 Id.
202. In Pierce v. O'Brien, 129 Mass.
314, CoLT, J., said: "An assignment
made by the debtor himself in another
state, which, if made here, would be set
aside for want of consideration, will not
be sustained against an attachment by a
Massachusetts creditor, although valid
in the place where made. There is no
comity which requires us to give force to
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laws of another state which directly conflict with the laws of our own, or to
allow to the act of the debtor resident in
another state an effect in disposing of his
property, as against his creditors here,
which it would not have if he lived in
Massachusetts." See further, Andrews
v. Herriot, 4 Cow. 510; LeRoy v. Crowninshield, 2 Mason 157 ; Bishop v. flolcomb, 10 Conn. 444 ; 2 Kent's Coin.
407 et seq. ; Sill v. Worswick, 1 Hen.
Bl. 693; Philips v. Hunter, 2 Id. 405 ;
Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 602;
Hoyt v. Thompson, 19 Id. 226; People
v. Com. of Taxes, 23 Id. 224 ; Edgerly
v. Bush, 81 Id. 199, 206.
Freen v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. (74
U. S.) 139, is an interesting case. The
facts were: A citizen of New York
being indebted to B., a citizen of the
same state, mortgaged certain personal
chattels which he had in Illinois to B.
Two days after, and before the mortgage could be recorded in Illinois, or
the property delivered, both being
necessary by the law of Illinois (though
-not by the laws of New York), to
the validity of the mortgage, C., to whom
A. was also indebted, and who was also
a citizen of New York, attached the property which A. had mortgaged to B. in
the state of Illinois. B. then brought
suit in New York against C. for converting the chattel. 0. pleaded in bar
the proceedings in attachment in Illinois.
The New York courts held that the
question whether B. had property in the
chattels on the day of attachment was to
be determined by the law of the domicile
of the parties, and- as by the New York
laws B. took title to the property the moment the mortgage was executed, the
attachment in Illinois was not a bar.
The United States Supreme Court reversed this decision, and held that the
laws of Illinois governed as to B.'s property in the chattels on the day of the
attachment. This case is reaffirmed in
Hervey v. R. I. Locomotive Works, 93
U. S. (3 Otto) 664 ; see Clark v. Tar-
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bell, 58 N. H. 88 ; Dannerv. Brewer, 69
Ala. 191.
In Varnum v. Camnp, 1 Green (N. J.)
326, it was held that a general assignment, made in a foreign jurisdiction by
a debtor in favor of his creditors, was
not valid so as to pass title to the personal effects of the debtor situated within
the state of New Jersey as against the
creditors of the assignor, if it cofitravened
the essential provisions of the statute of
New Jersey regulating such assignments.
The fact that the transfer was valid by
the laws of debtor's domicile would not
render effectual property subject to New
Jersey laws. This case was affirmed in
Moore v. Bonnell, 31 N. J. L. (2 Vroom)
90, 94. In Bentley v. MVhittenore, 19
N. J. Eq. 462, the Chief Justice, in
commenting on Varnum v. Camp, supra,
said: " The ground of decision in that
case was, that we had established in this
state a local policy under which our citizens had a right to be protected. It was
admitted that, as a general rule, a transfer of property valid where made, would
be effectual everywhere; but it was also
deemed equally clear that the recognised
exception to the rule was that it was not
to be enforced to the manifest injury of
our own citizens. A state cannot be required, thus it was argued, by any of
the obligations of comity, to give up it,
own system, and substitute in lieu of its
any part of the social arrangement of a
foreign jurisdiction. This limitation, as
well as the rule itself, is firmly established as a part of our international
law."
Mr. Justice CoRuisx, in Andrews v.
Herriot, 4 Cow. (N. Y.) 510, admitted
the general rule to be that the lex loci
contractus governed, but "with the exception of cases in which the contract is
immoral or unjust, or in which the enforcing it in a state would be injurious to the
rights, the interests or convenience of
such state or citizens."
In Bryan v. Brisbin, 26 Mo. 423, the
assignment was made in Minnesota, and
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made preferences, and was valid by
Minnesota laws, but such preferences
were invalid by laws of Missouri. It
was held that this assignment would not
operate against an attaching resident
creditor of the assignor in the Missouri
courts. The court said : "We are asked
to enforce an assignment, which could
not be made and enibreed if made in this
state, as it must and will be by the laws
of Minnesota, in opposition to the claims
of a creditor resident here, who has
attached the properly previous to any
notice of assignment. It is not understood that comity requires a court to
enforce a contract valid according to the
laws of the place where the contract is
made, if such enforcement would be attended with manifest injustice to the
claims of the citizens of the county
where the property is located and where
the claim is asserted. Justice must not
be sacrificed to courtesy. It is very obvious that if we hold the assignment to
prevail over the attachment, we make a
discrimination against our own citizens.
* * * There is no principle of comity
which requires us to go this far." See
Brown v. Knox, 6 Mo. 302, 306;
Jhnson v. Parker, 4 Bush (Ky.) 149.
Mr. Justice 2DAVIS, in Green v. Van
Buskirk, 38 How. Pr. 60, truly stated
the doctrine of the weight of authority,
when he said that there is no absolute
right to have such transfers respected,
that it is only on principles of comity
that it is allowed ; "and this principle
of comity," remarked lie, " always
yields when the laws and policy of the
state where the property is located have
prescribed a different rule of transfer
from that of the state where the owner
lives."
In referring to Judge STomR's statement that personal property is governed by the law of domicile, SARGENT,
J., in Dunlap v. Rogers, 47 N. H. 287,
observed : "But whatever weight the
English or early New York authorities
might otherwise have been entitled to,
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the great weight of American authority
is now the other way; and it may be
considered as part of the settled jurisprudence of this country, that personal
property, as against creditors, has locality, and the lex loci rei sita prevails
over the law of the domicile with regard
to the rule of preferences in the case of
insolvent estates. The laws of other
governments have no force beyond their
territorial limits; and if permitted to
operate in other states it is upon principles of comity, ani only when neither the
state nor its citizens would suffer any
inconvenience from the application of
the foreign law."
Distinction between Debts and Movables.-There has been a distinction
taken in some cases as to the situs between debts and movables-the latter
being capable of having a situs not the
former-as they follow the domicile of
the owner: People v. Com. of Texas,
23 N. Y. 224. Mr. Justice PECKHAM,
in Guillander v. Howell, 35 N. Y. 657,
said Speed v. May, supra, and Caskie v.
Webster, supra, were sound law, because of this distinction. But, as above
observed, neither of those cases were put
upon this distinction, but upon the simple principle that a voluntary assignment of movables, valid where made, is
valid everywhere. Yet in both those
cases the items in controversy were
debts. Mr. Justice PECoHAm.r, in the
casesupra, in speaking of this distinction,
"
said :
A chose in action cannot be
surely said to have any actual situs in
the place where the debtor resides. As
a general principle it is payable at the
residence of the creditor if not otherwise
expressed, and a tender to be good must
be made to the creditor. There would
seem, therefore, to be no sound basis for
the debtor's state to legislate exclusively
as to the legality of the transfer of that
debt made by a foreign creditor. In
such cases, as in all others where the property transferred does not actually lie
within the jurisdiction of another gov-
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ernmeut, a sale or a contract valid
where made is valid everywhere."
And in speaking of another Maryland
case, Mr. Justice PECKHuAM said: "The

Supreme Court in the third district, at
general term, in Thurman v. Stockwell,
lately held, that the exception did not
extend to a debt due from a resident
in Connecticut to a resident of this state,
but that an assignment thereof valid
here, though invalid there by her laws,
ought to be valid there also, even as
against residents of Connecticut, because
a debt is not a corpus capable of local
position, but merely ajus incorporeal."
In Howard Nat. Bank v. King, 10
Abb. (N. Y.) N. Cases 346, the New
York Supreme Court, in referring to this
question said: "The rule in regard to
personal property that it has no situs,
but that it follows the person of the
owner, is elementary. As a corollary
from that rule, it follows that personal
property is governed in its transfer and
disposition by the law of the domicile of
its owner, that is, by the law of the
place where the sale is made, so that if
a sale or other transfer be valid where
made, it is valid everywhere." After
admitting the exception that the transfer
is invalid in another state in which the
property is actually situated, if it conflicts with the laws of that state, and
pronouncing it logically inconsistent with
the above rule and corollary, the court
continued: "From an examination of
the authorities in the light of the rule, I
am of opinion that the exception affects
only movable property, and does not
operate upon credits or other ehoses in
action held by the person who makes the
assignment or transfer, and that in so
far as they are concerned, they are governed by the general rules above mentioned, and that they have no situs apart
from the domicile of their owner, and if
a transfer of them he made in the state
in which the owner is domiciled, which
is valid there, it is effectual everywhere."
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But in Pilson v. Barnes, 50 Penn. St.
230, it was expressly held that a debt
had a situs, inasmuch as a foreign assignment could not transfer it in the domicile of the debtor if it contravenes some
See,
positive legislative enactment.
also, Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196.
But see IN'oble v. Smith, 6 R. 1. 446 ;
Mowry v. Crocker, 6 Wis. 326; Smith
v. Ch. 4- N. W. Railroad Co:, 23 Id.
267 ; Fuller v. Steiglitz, 27 Ohio St.
355.
Question between Foreiqn Parties.-It
has been repeatedly held, by an almost
unbroken line of authorities, that where
the question of extra-territorial property
arises between a foreign assignee and a
foreign creditor, the laws where the assignment was made will determine its
validity: Vran Buskirk v. Warren, 39 N.
Y. 119 ; Abraham v. Plestoro, 3 Wend.
540; Plestoro v. Abraham, I Paige 236;
May v. WIannemacher, 111 Mass. 202;
Whipple v. Tlayer, 16 Pick. 25; Kidder v. Tufts, 48 N. H. 125; Hall v.
Boardman, 14 Id. 38; Punlapv. Rogers,
47 Id. 287 ; Smith v. Brown, 43 Id. 44;
Richardson v. Forepaugh, 7 Gray 546;
R. 1. Bank v. Dan/brth, 14 Id. 123
Bank of U. S. v. Lee, 13 Peters 107;
s. c. 5 Cranch C. C. 319; Crapo v.
Kelly, 16 Wall. 610; Pond v. Cooke, 45
Conn. 132; Dehon v. Foster, 4 Allen
545; Burlock v. Taylor, 16
(lass.)
Pick. (Mass.) 335.
In Einer v. Beste, 32 Mo. 240, the
parties were all citizens of Louisiana.
The assignment was made in that state
It operated upon
and good there.
all of the debtor's property, some of
One of the
which was in Missouri.
creditors of the assignor, resident of
Louisiana, attached property in Missouri.
It was held that the assignee's right to
the property would prevail over the nonresident attaching creditor.
7arston v. .Rosen.field, 42 Mo. 474,
affirms the principle of this last case. In
that case the parties were all residents
of New York and New Jersey. The
VOL. XXXII-52.
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debtor made a voluntary asignment of
his effects in New York for tle benefit
of his creditors, in which certain of them
The assignment inwere preferred.
cluded certain real estate situated in Missouri. It was valid by New York laws,
but would have been void if made in
The plaintiff attached the
Missouri.
debtor's Missouri property. It was held
that the attachment suit could not be
The court affirmed the
maintained.
general principle that a foreign assignment, made directly i'n opposition to their
legislation, should never have the efflect
of giving an advantage to non-resident
creditors to the injury of their own citizens. "But," said the court, "as this
case presents no such question, we think
comity requires and justice will be subserved by holding the assignment good
according to the laws of the place where
executed. See First Vational Bank v.
-Hughes,10 Mo. App. 7, 22, where it was
held that a deed of assignment of land,
void where made, but valid by laws of*
Missouri, would effectually pass title to
land in Missouri, against an attachment
upon such land at the suit of a citizen of
a third state. See State Bank Receiver
v. Plainfield Bank, 34 N. J. Eq. 450.
In Bently v. Whittemore, 19 N. J. Eq.
432, the assignment was made in New
York between New York parties and good
there. It was sought to be attacked in
the courts of New Jersey, in so far as it
operated upon property within that state,
by a non-resident, because it was invalid
Mr. Justice
by New Jersey laws.
BEAnDSLY, in giving the opinion, said:
"Upon what principle can a citizen of
-another state ask us to refuse to recognise the validity of an assignment made in
the state of New York and in conformity
to her laws? Upon what plea consistent
with comity, under such circumstances,
are the authorities of this government to
repudiate a transaction valid by the laws
of a sister state ? If the question touched
one of our own citizens, we could vindicate our rejection of such transaction on
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the ground of our statute, passed legitiBut Paine v. Lester, 44 Conn. 196,
mately, for the special regulation of the does not seem to haraonize with the
affairs of such citizen. But if such a re- above cases. The case makes no disjection relates to the citizens of another tinction between citizens of Connecticut
state, how is such a line of conduct to be and citizens of sister states. The facts
justified ? We might, indeed, urge, as a were: A corporation of Pennsylvania
sort of excuse, that the laws of New York made an assignment for the benefit of
regulating assignments were not similar its creditors in that state, and which
to the laws of this state, and that we pre- was valid there. One item included a
ferred the regulations of our law. * * * debt due from a citizen of Connecticut.
But I cannot think we have a right to en- The transfer was not good by laws of
deavor to arbitrate in such a concern. ** * Connecticut. After assignment a citiThe true rule of law and public policy zen of Rhode Island attached the debt
is this : " That a voluntary assignment in Connecticut. The attachment was
made abroad, inconsistent in substantial held to prevail. In this case # was said
respects with our statutes, should not be
(p. 204) : "The citizens of all our sisput in execution here to the detriment
ter states have, by the Constitution of
of our own citizens, but that, for all other the United States, the same privileges
purposes, if valid by the lex loci, it with our own citizens, and any one of
should be carried fully into effect."
So, them who has availed himself of the legal
in Whipple v. Thayer, 16 Pick. 25, this remedies furnished by our laws, to serule is well illustrated.
The parties cure payment of a debt due him, has the
were all citizens of Rhode Island, where same claim to the assistance of our
the deed of assignment was made and courts that one of our own citizens
operated to convey property in Massa- would have." But the doctrine of this
chusetts. It conformed to Rhode Island case is exceptional.
laws, but not with the laws of MassaIn Wtode Island Bank v. Danforth, 14
chusetts. A Rhode Island citizen at- Gray (Mass.) 123, the Massachusetts
tached a portion of the property in Supreme Court said: " An execution
Massachusetts. The title of the assignee has sometimes been made in favor of
was held to prevail. Burlock v. Taylor, creditors residing in Massachusetts, and
16 Pick. 335, and Daniels v. Willard, who had made attachments here -which
Id. 36, hold likewise.
were sought to be avoided by an assignIn Atwcood v. Protection Ins. Co., 14 ment or transfer 'in another state to
Conn. 555, tie subject of controversy secure creditors. But this is not the
was a debt due from a company in Con- case here ; all the parties are citizens of
necticut to a citizen of Ohio. The as- Rhode Island, and a valid mortgage
signment, made in Ohio and good there, there may transfer the property in Mastransferred this debt to the assignee, also sachusetts."
a citizen of Ohio, but it did not conActual Change of Possession.-Ifthere
form to Connecticut laws. A Penn- is an actual change of possession, the
sylvania citizen attached this debt in transfer is good everywhere, yet it has
Connecticut.. It was held that the as- been held by some cases, that this change
signment dffectually passed the debt. See must conform to the laws of the place
further, Richardson v. Leavitt, I La. where the property is situated : Koster v.
Ann. 430. Bholen v. Cleveland, 5 Merritt, 32 Conn. 246 ; Mead v. Dayton,
Mason 174, is an instructive case on 28 Id. 33 ; Chafee v. Fourth National
this subject. The courts of New Hamp- Bank, 71 Me. 514 ; Forbes v. Scannell,
shire have announced this rule: Sander- 13 Cal. 241 ; Pdilson.. Barnes, .50 Pa.
son v. Bradford, 10 N. H. 260.
St. 230 ; Hanford v. Paine, 32 Vt. 442 ;
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Bice v. Gurts, 32 Vt. 460, 464. Thus,
in the last case, the assignment was made
in New York and valid, but not in conformity to the laws of Vermont, where
the property was situated.
The assignee took actual possession. It was
held the title of the assignee was not
effectual. And in Philson v. Barnes, 50
Pa. St. 230, the assignment contract was
made in Maryland, and dperated on
property in Pennsylvania. It was valid
in Maryland, but not in conformity with
the laws of Pennsylvania, because not
recorded in the county where the property
was located. The property was attached
by a Pennsylvania citizen, and his title
was sustained. But in Ockernan v.
Cross, 54 N. Y. 29, a different ruie was
laid down. The assignment was executed in Canada, and valid there, but not
in compliance with the laws of New
York, because not "prepared, acknowledged and recorded."
The assigneegot
possession of the property. It was held
that the assignee's title to the property
was complete. And a like ruling is
made by the Supreme Court of California,
in Forbes v. Scannell, 13 Cal. 242. The
property was located in California, and
owned by citizens of the United States residing and doing business in Canton,
China. The assignment was executed in
China, but was not good by the laws of
California. The assignee took actual possession, and his title was held good.
BALDwX N, J., in giving the opinion, said
(p. 277)
"The truth is, we do notconsider this question as one of comity at
all. It is a pure question of property.
By our general laws we recognise the
duty of government to protect property,
and that is, property which is acquired by
contract, lawful and effectual to pass title
in the place where it is made. It might as
well be said, that if a man made his
money by usury in California, and carried it into Pennsvlvania, the courts of
that state would refuse to recognise his
right, because usury is against the policy
of Pennsylvania. Or if won at cards, in
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Mexico, where no law exists against
gaming, it would cease to be his property
whenever brought into this state."
Transfer TValid by Lex loci Contractus
the assignment is
and Lex foi.-If
good by the laws of the state of
the assignor's domicile where the assignment is made, and also valid where the
property is situated, it will be upheld as
against an attaching creditor in the courts
of the latter state. Millkr v. Kernaghau, 56 Ga. 155. In answer to the contention that the domestic tribunals will
hold assets against foreign assignment,
the court said: "Certainly this would
be done if the assignment were not comformable to our own laws, but there
would be no inconsistency in recognising
the assignment as perfectly valid here,
and then refusing to yield to it. There
may be decisions in other states or countries on that erratic line, but we are sure
sound principle is the other way, and so
we believe is the weight of authority.
* * * An assignment, whether foreign
or domestic, that presents no conflict with
any law, is to have full effect on all assets to which its terms apply." This
ease fully accords with the principal case.
And it was held, in Ockerman v. Cross,
54 N. Y. 29, that such an assignment,
not invalidated by any law of New York,
would pass title of personal property of
the debtor, situated in that state, to the
assignee. To same effect, see Walkerv.
Whitlock, 9 Fla. 87, 103. After reviewing the authorities, the court said: "This
assignment being a voluntary one, by
deed, formal and irrevocable, containing
no provisions repugnant to our laws, nor
to the policy and positive institutions of
this state, and there being nothing to prohibit the assignors, who are citizens of
other states, from a free disposal of their
personal property situated here, we
must, upon the principles of comity between sister states, hold the assignment
valid here, and that it operated at its
execution to vest the title in the assignee
and divested all the interest of the as-

